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1 Introduction 
This paper may seem a little exotic among the contributions to the 
present volume, not because its concern is the application of Situation 
Theory to Situation Semantics—there are other contributions that share 
this concern—but because its concern is furthermore the application of 
Situation Semantics to so-called exotic languages like the Iroquoian lan-
guages, which may seem premature at this stage of the development of the 
theory. 
So why apply Situation Semantics to Iroquoian instead of, say, En-
glish or Norwegian? And why use Situation Semantics for the analysis of 
Iroquoian, instead of, say, Montague Semantics or the Principles and Pa-
rameters theoretical frame? The answer to the first question is that I want 
Situation Semantics to be tailored right from the beginning in a way that it 
fits any natural language, not just English or Norwegian. So I have to look 
for languages that are as difFerent as possible from the well-known Stan-
dard Average European languages (or SAE languages for short, as Whorf 
(1956) has dubbed them), and the Iroquoian languages seem to be located 
at one extreme point of a scale in that they are extremely verb-oriented, 
whereas SAE languages are both noun and verb oriented. I will come back 
to what that means shortly. 
In preparing this paper I have profited from the interesting discussion and encouraging 
commentsby the participants of the Kinloch Rannoch Conference as well as from remarks 
by Hans-Jürgen Sasse and Godehard Link. Special thanks are due to an anonymous 
referee whose to-the-point comments greatly helped me to clarify and revise my main 
issue. Remaining shortcomings should be blamed, as usual, to the author, and not to 
anyone of the aforementioned. 
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The answer to the second question can be easily derived from a quo-
tation from Barwise: "I think of this [the view of inquiry as crucially 
a situated activity] as part of a larger reaction against the dominant 
theme in Western thought, the idea that agents ever step back and have 
a God's eye view of the world, as Thomas Nagel has called it, 'a view 
from nowhere\ As Hilary Putnam has observed, the rejection of the view 
from nowhere idea is something that ties together disciplines as diverse 
as quantum mechanics and the work on semantical paradoxes. To my 
mind, it is what drives Situation theory and Situation semantics." (Bar-
wise 1989, p. 251) 
I may add that it is also what drives modern linguistic typology and 
research into linguistic universals, as well as the investigation of how much 
of the Humboldt-Sapir-Whorf hypothesis about linguistic relativity, if any-
thing, remains, if the presently available data are taken into account. A 
situated inquiry of linguistic relativity is aware of the fact that it starts 
out from a view of natural languages that takes Indo-European languages 
(Whorfs SAE languages) as a prototype. It then looks for languages that 
are as far as possible from this common conception of what a language 
should look like. A prominent feature of this common conception is the 
centrality of the NP-VP-dichotomy. So languages that make only marginal 
use of what might be justifiably called a noun phrase, like Cayuga and 
other Northern Iroquoian languages are of special interest for this enter-
prise. Therefore, the bulk of this paper is devoted to a sketch o fa Situation 
semantics for Cayuga. The final section will assess (a) the consequences of 
this challenge for Situation theory and (b) how well the linguistic relativity 
hypothesis fares in the light of the proposed analysis. 
2 Stepping Back from the SAE-Perspective 
If we want to develop Situation Semantics towards universal applicability 
we have to step back from our SAE-perspective of what a natural language 
looks like, and have to ask ourselves what remains constant if we compare 
all kinds of natural languages. One thing that has to remain stable are 
our basic categories such as nouns, verbs and adjectives. Within X-bar 
theory, the framework most recent work in the so-called generative gram-
mar paradigm is based on, there is a widespread tendency (going back to 
Chomsky 1970) to reduce the four central lexical categories noun, verb, ad-
jective, and preposition to the even more fundamental categorial features 





[+V, - N ] 
[ -V, +N] 
[+V, +N] 
[ -V, - N ] 
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It may be hard to see why the neither-nor case should characterize the 
category P instead of all the rest, but what is obvious is the view that the 
N - V Opposition is considered something very fundamental. 
In linguistic typology it is a widely accepted fact that there are lan-
guages which get along without any adjectives (the example G i v ö n (1984, 
p. 53) cites is Toposa, a Nilotic language), but not all linguists agree that 
there are languages that collapse the N-V distinction, a possibility brought 
into the discussion some 70 years ago by Edward Sapir with respect to 
Nootka, an American Indian language of the Wakashan family. The plausi-
bility of the assumption that there are languages which get along basically 
without an N-V distinction has gained new support through data from the 
Northern Iroquoian languages which suggest that NP's play at most a very 
marginal role in these languages.1 
The interesting thing is that even if a language without any N-V dis-
tinction cannot be attested, it can be argued that it is still a possible 
human language, i.e., that it is learnable and that it has the same general-
purpose functionality and expressive power as any other full-fledged human 
language, and the question comes up of how this can be. Furthermore, 
for Situation Semantics the question of Barwise's branch point 9 (Barwise 
1990, p. 267) concerning the relation between situations and objects comes 
up: Verbs and the sentences they head are about situations, nouns and the 
NP's they head are about objects (directly or indirectly). But if the N-V 
distinction can collapse in some languages, one should reconsider seriously 
Ken Olson's choice at branch point 9 such that the situation-object distinc-
tion may collapse as well, at least for some perspectives, and that where it 
exists it is a perspectival one. Here is the branch point as Barwise puts it: 
Alternative 9.1: Every object is a Situation. 
Alternative 9.2: Some objects are situations, some are not. 
Ken Olson's choice is 9.1, that every object is a Situation. This seems 
to be at odds with Barwise's thesis 3 (1989, p. 232), which can be ren-
dered schematically as follows (where is to be read as 'is metaphysically 
prior to*): 
situations < facts/soas2/objects/properties/relations < propositions 
and which entails that situations are metaphysically prior to objects. But 
the views can be reconciled, if one takes into account Piaget's Observation 
that objects arise in the development of human Cognition at the moment 
where recurring situations are attributed to something more stable which 
causes them to come about. So objects may be considered as the result of 
1In fact, the data are less new than their Interpretation in the indicated way. See Sasse 
1988, 1991, n.d. 
2The term 'soa' is short for 'state of afTairs'. Instead of this term, I will use in what 
follows its successor, 'infon', which Stands for 'unit of information'. 
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associating prima facie situations with certain stability conditions, which 
yields those time-stable 'situations' that are called objects. 
But the quotation marks around 'situations' in the last sentence point at 
another reason for rejecting Olson's choice, a terminological one. It looks 
like some terminological clarifications are needed before we can assess it 
seriously. 
3 Terminological Considerations 
A third alternative not mentioned by Barwise comes into mind if one thinks 
about the pretheoretical use of the notions involved: 
Alternative 9.3: Objects and situations are disjoint. 
Pretheoretically, situations are always situations of some object(s), the sit-
uations these objects are in, and most of the time, these situations are not 
objects themselves. Consider for instance your current financial Situation: 
You are an object, your financial Situation is not. But how about local 
situations? Maybe you are sitting in a building. Then the building may 
be considered one of the local situations you are in. But at the same time 
it continues to be an object. So alternative 9.3 does not seem to be very 
plausible. On the other hand, if a necessary condition for situationhood is 
the possibility for an object to be in that Situation, alternative 9.1 can be 
excluded as well if one assumes that there are (given some granularity) min-
imal objects (with respect to that granularity), namely those objects that 
cannot contain any other object, since these objects cannot be a Situation 
for any other object. 
But now the question comes up how closely the pretheoretical use of 
the notion of Situation and its use in Situation Theory are tied together. 
In Situation Theory, situations are parts of some world that support infons 
relative to some scheme of individuation. Intuitively this characterization 
holds equally well of situations and of objects in the pretheoretical sense. 
But there may be other, theoretical reasons for excluding some kinds of 
objects from the domain of the supports relation. Without them, the only 
reason for rejecting Olson's choice is a terminological one. 
Technical and everyday use of a term may diverge, but they should not 
diverge to such a degree that it hurts. Your reading this here now is a 
Situation, part of the Situation you are in right now, but you are not a 
Situation. It may be funny to say that everybody is precisely the Situation 
he is necessarily in all his life long, b u t it seems preferable not to overload 
the notion Situation a n d to coin a new term that Covers b o t h situations 
a n d objects. 
You are not a Situation, but you are, among other things, a reader, or, 
equivalently, a case of a reader. The activity you are engaged in is reading, 
or, equivalently, a case of reading. So my proposal for a term covering 
both situations and objects is case. Now we can discuss Olson's choice in 
P R O B I N G T H E IROQUOIAN P E R S P E C T I V E / 537 
an unbiased way, since we can say that a proposition is something that 
relates a (possibly concrete) case and a (necessarily abstract) infon (alias 
state of affairs, type, or concept) via a relation that is written '(=', which 
can be read as 'is a model of' or 'supports' or 'is correctly classified by' or 
'instantiates' or 'is characterizable by \ For the sake of readability I will 
however stick to the conventional notation (s \= er), asking the reader to 
bear in mind that s Stands for cases, where cases can be coneeived of as 
subsuming either all objects or only part of them. 
Situations or cases that are of central relevance for Situation Semantics 
are situations or cases of language use. According to a very attractive 
proposal made by Jon Barwise in his Branch Point paper (1989, p. 275), 
we need in addition to Austinian propositions what he calls Holmesian 
propositions, which differ from the former in that their situations support 
their infons not directly, but via a collection of constraints. Holmesian 
propositions are at the heart of my picture of language, since cases of 
language use carry the important part of their information not on their 
sleeves, but only indirectly via certain constraints, namely the Conventions 
defining the language in question. But instead of saying 'Situation s, in 
addition to supporting infon er, carries the information r with respect to 
some collection of constraints C , we can now also say 'case s, in addition 
to instantiating concept er, C-indicates concept r \ where C is again a 
collection of constraints holding in some supercase of s, i.e., a case that s 
is a part of. 
So my basic picture of language use looks like follows. A case of language 
use is a case that instantiates some concept of a perceivable action trace 
pattern like the utterance of [?mra] and that C-indicates some concept 
of an abstract social interaction pattern such as putting the cooperative 
addressee under the Obligation to look, if the collection of constraints C 
includes the rules of Spanish grammar (in German, the outcome would be 
different). Symbolically: If s is a case of language use, then there are <r, C 
and r such that 5 (= er and s \=c f, where er is a concept of a perceivable 
action trace pattern, C is a collection of Conventions of language use, and 
r a concept of an abstract social interaction pattern. 
In order to compensate the reader for following me through these rather 
abstract terminological preliminaries I would now like to invite him to an 
imaginary field trip to the area north of lake Erie, where several Iroquoian 
Indian tribes live. 
4 Comparing the English and the Iroquoian 
Perspective 
Based on what we have heard about the Northern Iroquoian languages and 
their tendency to neglect the nouns and noun phrases Europeans are so 
fond of, our imaginary journey has at least three purposes: 
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1. We want to find out whether Situation Semantics is flexible enough 
to deal equally well with Mohawk or Cayuga as it does with English 
or Norwegian. 
2. We want to see whether the Iroquoian languages are more easily 
describable if the objects are subsumed under the situations, i.e., 
whether their structure can be turned into an argument for Olson's 
choice.3 
3. We would like to find some evidence for or against the Humboldt-
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis of linguistic relativity, which would entail 
that the dramatically different structure of the Iroquoian languages 
forces or induces their Speakers to see the world from a very different 
perspective. 
Let us assume that the first Iroquoian Indians we come across are Cayu-
gas, and that we immediately meet a reliable Indian informant. But before 
we start to ask him questions let us recapitulate what we already know 
about the English-Cayuga differences. 
The English perspective seems to distinguish at least two kinds of cases, 
cases of objects and cases of situations, be they activities, events or states. 
This is correlated with the fact that English noun phrases denote either 
Single objects (as with proper names and (in)definite descriptions) or sets 
of sets thereof (at least according to the Generalized Quantifier analysis), 
whereas verbs denote properties which together with appropriate argu-
ments can characterize situations. Cayuga Speakers get along in general 
quite well without nouns or noun phrases and it seems rather plausible 
that the few exceptions could fade away without doing any harm. How do 
the Cayugas do that? 
Let us look first at the Cayuga lexicon. What we find here is basically 
a two-fold distinction between (a) particles, i.e., uninflected words, and (b) 
paradigms, i.e., inflected words with all their word forms. Some of the 
word forms have acquired an idiomatic reading, which is the main reason 
why most Iroquoianists assume that Cayuga does have nouns. But Sasse 
(1988) correctly points out that these forms include the same morphologi-
cal marking as the other word forms, and the categories which are encoded 
in this morphological marking are person, number and gender of both ac-
tor and undergoer. These are typical features of conjugation rather than 
declension, so the conclusion seems to be warranted that these word forms 
are verb forms and not noun forms. It turns out furthermore that each 
such verb form is autonomous, i.e., its use expresses by itself a complete 
proposition without the need for any syntactical complements. 
This is strongly reminiscent of the so-called pro-drop languages like Ital-
ian or Spanish, where single word forms like 'habla* without any comple-
3In Zaefferer 1988 I have argued for the same Option, sketching a case-based semantics 
which is spelled out in Zaefferer 1989. 
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ments can encode complete propositions ('he talks'). There are, however, 
two important difFerences with the pro-drop languages. The first is that 
Cayuga is double-pro-drop: Not only subjects are dropped, but also ob-
jects. This can happen in Hungarian as well and, without morphological 
reflexes, in languages like Japanese or Korean. So the second difference is 
more important and more surprising: Pro-drop languages do have comple-
ments with their verbs; these complements can be dropped, especially if 
they are pronominal, in which case dropping may be obligatory for non-
emphaticproforms, but in principle, they can be there as overt constituents. 
Cayuga, by contrast, does not have any complements as separate con-
stituents; arguments are (a) always morphologically encoded by means of 
a prefix, and (b) only pronominal in nature. So it looks as if something like 
'She has prepared it' is expressible in Cayuga, whereas 'Your mother has 
prepared the meaP is not. How can this seeming restriction be overcome? 
In order to find out, we ask our informant to translate an English sentence 
with a two-place verb and two non-pronominal arguments into Cayuga. 
The sentence we choose is (1). 
(1) My younger Brother has many potatoes. 
Sentence (1) contains two noun phrases, 'my younger brother' and 'many 
potatoes', and the only verb around is 'has'. How can our informant pos-
sibly express this proposition in Cayuga without using any noun phrases? 
Before we look at Iiis translation, let us first express (1) in a Situation 
Semantics style. I assume with Barwise (e.g., 1989, pp. 228f) that every 
proposition consists of the Situation or case it concerns (called focus Sit-
uation by Barwise, thematic Situation or case by me, since in linguistic 
terminology, focus is something different), and the state of affairs or in-
fon which is used to classify it, together with the supports relation that is 
claimed to hold between the two. 
As mentioned above, the notation I use for propositions is the usual 
one: (s |= er). Following a Suggestion of Barwise's,4 restricted parameters 
are written to the left of the parametric proposition in which they occur, 
followed by a colon and the restricting proposition; the list of restrictions 
is closed by a vertical stroke. In order to enhance readability, parameter 
restrictions are pulled as far to the left as possible.5 An atomic infon is 
written between double angles, its relation before its arguments (postspec-
ifying constituent order), arguments are preceded by the corresponding 
argument role label, followed by a colon. If there is only one argument, 
hence no need to distinguish between arguments, no argument role is indi-
cated; positive polarities are omitted, and tense is ignored. So a Situation 
Semantics representation of (1) looks like the following: 
(1') s : (sutt (= ((thematic, s ) ) ) 
4 Personal communication, September 1990. 
5 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this notational hint. 
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x : (s (= ((younger-brother, possessumrx, p o s s e s s o r . S p e a k e r ( s u t t ) ) ) ) 
y : (s \= ((many-potatoes, y ) ) ) \ 
($ \= ((have, possessor:« , possessum:y))) 
(1') expresses a parametric proposition whose supporting Situation is re-
stricted by the requirement that it is thematic in the utterance Situation, 
and whose infon is parametric in both arguments of 'have', the possessor 
being restricted to a younger brother of the Speaker, the possessum to a 
large quantity of potatoes. The relations involved are: Speaker in the utter-
ance Situation (<my>), 'younger brother of, i.e., 'male' and 'younger sibling 
of , large quantity ('many'), 'potato', and possession ('my', 'have'). The 
same relations will have to be expressed in the Cayuga translation of (1), 
but how are they expressed? Here is the translation our informant gives:6 
(2) he-'k§:'-£ ho-hon'at-a-k'ate' 
Its analysis yields the following results. Syntactically, (2) consists of two 
words, hence two clauses, and forms a two-membered complex sentence. Its 
morphological building blocks are the following: -'k^'-, "younger-sibling", 
-hon'at-, "potato", and -k'ate'-, "be-many", are roots. The latter is pre-
specified by the second one, yielding the complex stem -hon'at-a-k'ate'-
with the semantically empty linker -ä- and the meaning "be many with 
respect to potatoes", or in Sasse's (1991) wording, "be many potatowise". 
The first stem is also complex, the root - 'k§:'- , "younger sibling", is mod-
ified by the diminutive suflix and the resulting stem 'k£:'-£ therefore 
means "little younger sibling." 
Now comes the interesting part: the prefixes he- and ho- are both per-
son prefixes and, as mentioned above, Cayuga person prefixes encode pairs 
of feature structures for the features thematic role, person, number, and 
gender. The value for the first feature is always actor for the first coordi-
nate and undergoer for the second one. The values for the person feature 
can be first (exclusive and inclusive), second, and third; for the number fea-
ture singular, dual, and plural; for the gender feature masculine, feminine, 
and neuter. The he-prefix of the first clause in (2) encodes ((actor, first, 
singular, any),(undergoer, third, singular, masculine)), or, shorter, 'I-him'. 
But in order to fully understand the first word-clause, our informant teils 
us, we need one additional piece of information, namely that for inalien-
able possessive relations 'actor' can also encode 'possessor' and 'undergoer' 
'possessed'. (With alienable possession, the converse holds.) Now we are 
able to interpret the first part of (2) as expressing the proposition that the 
Speaker has a male person as little younger sibling or as an equivalent of "I 
have a little younger brother." A Situation Semantics style representation 
is (2a'): 
6The example is taken from Mithun and Henry 1982 (p. 381), its analysis mostly from 
Sasse 1988. 
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(2a') s : (sutt (= ((thematic, s))), 
x : (sutt \= ((speaker(su ( t), x ) ) ) PI (« |= ((sg, x})), 
V : ( S u t t N ((third, y ) ) ) D ( $ \ = ((male, y» A ((sg, y ) » | 
(s |= ((little-younger-sibling, possessum:?/, possessor:x))) 
(2a') expresses a parametric proposition whose Situation is restricted by the 
requirement that it is thematic in the utterance Situation, and whose infon 
is parametric in both arguments of 'little-younger-sibling-of, the possessum 
being restricted to some non-speaking non-addressed male, the possessor 
to the Speaker. 
For an analogous interpretation of the second part of (2) we need the in-
formation encoded in the prefix ho-. It is ((actor, third, singular, neuter), 
(undergoer, third, singular, masculine)). So the meaning of the whole 
word-clause is "it, namely being many potatowise, concerns him", or, with 
Sasse's transliteration "it manies him potatowise" (Sasse 1991). A Situa-
tion Semantics style representation of this is (2b'): 
(2b') s' : ( s u t t (= ((thematic, «'))), 
z : ( s u t t (= ((third, z ) ) ) PI (*' |= ((neuter, z ) ) A ((sg, z))), 
u : ( s u t t N ((third, ti>» PI (*' \ = ((male, u ) ) A ((sg, u ) ) ) \ 
(5' \= ((be-many-potatowise, concerningiz, concernediiz))) 
(2b;) expresses a parametric p r o p o s i t i o n whose Situation is restricted by 
the requirement that it is thematic in the utterance Situation, and whose 
infon is parametric in both arguments of 'be-many-potatowise>, the con-
cerning entity being restricted to some non-speaking non-addressed thing, 
the concerned entity to some non-speaking non-addressed male. Joining 
both clauses of (2) yields a maximally coherent sentence if we identify all 
compatible parameters, namely s with s' and y with u. 
Now we can almost fully understand the literal meaning of the whole 
two-clause sentence (2). Our informant teils us the last missing piece of 
information: In Cayuga, he says, focused items come first. The literal 
translation "I have him as little younger sibling, he is someone who is con-
cerned by a large potato quantity" fails to express this. A better transla-
tion would be "My younger brother has many potatoes" with focus accent 
on 'brother', or "Someone who does have many potatoes is my younger 
brother", but all these translations, in one way or the other, distort the 
way the information is organized in the Cayuga sentence. The Situation 
Semantic representation in (2') does not. It puts the background informa-
tion into the restrictions of the parameters and the focal information into 
the infon of the proposition expressed by the whole two-clause sentence: 
(2') s : (sutt \= ((thematic, 5))), 
z : (sutt (= ((third, z ) ) ) PI (s |= ((neuter, z ) ) A ((sg, x))), 
y : (sutt (= ((third, y ) ) ) PI (s \= ((male, y ) ) A ((sg, y)> A 
((be-many-potatowise, concerning:2r, concerned:y))), 
542 / D I E T M A R Z A E F F E R E R 
x : (sutt r= ((speaker(su t t), x ) ) ) C i ( s \ = ((sg, x ) ) ) \ 
(s |= ((little-younger-sibling, possessum : y, possessor :x)y) 
(2') expresses a parametric proposition whose Situation is restricted by the 
requirement that it is thematic in the utterance Situation, and whosie infon 
is the relation of "little-younger-sibling-of' holding between som*e male 
not involved in the discourse who is concerned by some large quaratity of 
potatoes, and the Speaker: Talking about a Situation where a irtan has 
many potatoes, my little brother is such a man. 
We now can see that the restriction of Cayuga complements to pTefixed 
pronouns does not entail a restriction in expressive power, since the lexical 
specification of the arguments can be done by ana- or cataphoric corefer-
ence. So the answer to the question asked above: How do the Cayugas 
express the content of sentences like 'Your mother has prepared the meal' 
if the verb allows only pronominal complements as in 'She has prepared 
it'?—the answer is simply: by linking the three predications into a cata-
and anaphoric chain: 'You have her as a mother, she has prepared it, it is 
the meaP. 
But this answer to the first question raises immediately a second one. If 
virtually every word form has inherently two-place person prefixes, then the 
expressive power of Cayuga must be seriously restricted in another respect, 
since it can only express two-place relations. But this restriction can also be 
overcome. One way of encoding three-place relations is the incorporation of 
roots into complex stems mentioned above. In order to express the infon "I 
prepare food for you" we take the root 'prepare', premodify it by the root 
'food', prefix this stem by the 'I-you' morpheme and modify the result by 
a dative suffix, which changes the undergoer in a benefactive role. Another 
imaginable way of overcoming the same restriction would be the Splitting 
of sentences like "I do it for you" into something like "I do it, it is for you." 
But how about lower arities? The problem is exactly analogous to the 
problem a subject-predicate language like English faces in the case of zero-
place predicates like raining. The Solution in English is the use of a dummy 
subject 'it': 'it is raining', although semantically still zero-place (location 
does not count here, since it is not an argument, but aspecifier), is syntacti-
cally one-place, as required. The Cayuga Solution to the less-than-minimal 
arity problem is basically the same, but due to its inherent binarity it has 
two possibilities for the encoding of semantically unary predicates: Either 
the undergoer or the actor role can be filled by a dummy. The first case, 
person prefixes with the feature structure (..., (undergoer, third, singular, 
neuter)) is called the 'subject-intransitive paradigm', the second case, per-
son prefixes with feature structure ((undergoer, third, singular, neuter),...) 
is called the 'object-intransitive paradigm'. Therefore the 'it-it'-case opens 
two possibilities: ka- is chosen for semantically empty undergoers. o- for 
semantically empty actors. An example of the former case is ka-nyaht§: 
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with the root -nyaht§: 'turtle', yielding 'it turtles (it)' or 'it turtles'. A n 
example of the second case is o-ne:no' containing the root nemo' 'warm', 
literally '(it) warms it' or 'it is warmed', meaning 'it is warm weather'. 
Another example with semantically empty actor is given by the forms 
built from the stem -9kweh' 'be a person'. Prefixing it by h-, ak-, and 
k a:k- with feature structures ((actor, third, singular, male), (undergoer, 
third, singular, neuter)), ((actor, third, singular, female), (undergoer, third, 
singular, neuter)), and ((actor, third, plural, female), (undergoer, third, 
singular, neuter)), results in clause-words meaning 'he is a man', 'she is 
a woman', and 'they are women', respectively. The translations suggest 
that there is informational redundancy where there is none. 'It is a male 
person', 'it is a female person', 'they are female persons' would be better, 
but it would not be free of wrong implicatures either. (4') is a Situation 
Semantic representation of (4), the Cayuga translation of (3): 
(3) He is a man. 
(4) h-gkweh' 
(4U) s : (sutt (= ((thematic, 5))), 
x : (*„« N ((third, x») fl (s (= ((male, x ) ) A ((sg, x)))| 
(5 \= ((person,x))) 
5 Looking for Appropriate Supporters 
So far, so good. We see now how it is possible to get along without 
nouns and noun phrases, and how everything can be expressed by two-
place predicates, and we understand thus the structure of the forms of 
Cayuga paradigms. But as we saw right at the beginning of our field work, 
when we looked at the structure of the Cayuga lexicon, there are, alongside 
with the paradigms, particles in Cayuga, particles like n§:ky§h, "this," a 
demonstrative. 
(5) n£:ky§h 
Here, we have no person prefix, hence no motivation to represent this 
expression in a way similar to the representation of word forms, which 
wouldn't make sense any way, since a use of 'this' does clearly not consti-
tute a speech act with a propositional content at all. What it does is rather 
introduce a new parameter which can only be anchored to an entity pointed 
at by the Speaker in the utterance Situation: 
(5') x : ( s u t t f= ((point-at, pointer:speaker(sut<), pointed:x))) 
Therefore a use of such a deictic element constitutes always an incomplete 
utterance, which needs Company, as in (6): 
(6) n£:ky£h h-okweh' 
This can be translated, in an appropriate context, as "this man," but we 
know that literally it means "this one, he is a person." We could of course 
stick the contribution of the deictic element directly into the restriction 
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of the relevant parameter, as in (6'), but this would be cheating, since it 
would conceal the anaphoric pick-up of the person prefix, mimicking the 
structure of the loose translation, not of the literal one: 
(6') s : (sutt |= ( ( themat ic ,«) ) ) , 
x : (sutt \ = ((point-at, pointer :speaker (sut *), pointed:^)) A ((third, x } ) ) 
C\(s\= ((male, x ) ) A ((sg, x ) ) ) \ ( s (= ((person, x ) ) ) 
The following representation (6") certainly gives a more precise picture 
of the way the meaning is composed, introducing first a parameter for a 
deictically identified object and then a parameter for a singular male who 
is neither speaking nor addressed: 
(6") s : (sutt |= ((thematic, s ) ) ) , 
x : (sutt (= ((point-at, pointer:speaker(5utt),pointed:x))), 
y : (sutt |= ((third, y)))n(s \= ((male, y)) A ((sg, y)))\(s \ = ((person, y ) ) ) 
(6") shows that the deictic speech-act constituted by the utterance of 
n§:ky§h introduces as a new thematic entity the object pointed at by the 
Speaker, and that the following utterance of h-, the person prefix of h-
okweh\ introduces a second parameter. Then, by anaphor resolution, the 
two are identified. But now another question arises: What is the role of 
the thematic Situation 5 in such a proposition? It seems to be needed for 
the support of the features maleness and singularity at most. Whatever 
the thematic Situation was before the utterance of n§:ky£h, the utterance 
itself introduces a new theme into the discourse, namely the object pointed 
at, and therefore this very object suggests itself as the supporting part of 
the new proposition. This is what the representation (6'") encodes: 
(6'") s : (sutt \ = ((thematic, s » ) , 
x : (sutt \ = ((point-at, pointer:speaker(5u«), pointed:x))), 
y ' (suU (= ((third, y ) ) ) D (s (= ((male, y)) A ((sg, y)))|(x |= ((person, y ) ) ) 
But now we have a problem if we stick with alternative 9.2, admitting of 
objects that are not situations, and don't want to give up the assumption 
that only situations can support infons. (6 / / ;) contains a proposition-like 
form where an object supports an infon, and the whole thing would only be 
well-formed if the object pointed at happened to be a Situation. But we can 
turn this risky business into a safe one (and one that conforms more with 
the intuitions, at least those of the author) if we choose alternative 9.1 and 
subsume all objects under the situations (or cases). Then the thematic slot 
of a p r o p o s i t i o n can be filled equally well by a Situation and an object. And 
this seems to be exactly what is required for a natural account of deixis, 
since the entities referred to by pointing gestures are at least equally well 
objects as situations. 
Another unfamiliar phenomenon becomes visible once the intended an-
aphor resolution is carried out: the proposition takes the form 
(x (= ((person,x))) 
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Does this make sense at all? Can an object possibly support an infon with 
that very object in the argument role of the infon's relation? I think it 
can, and it is even an obvious candidate for playing both roles, that of 
the supporter and that of an argument in the supporting infon, in cases 
like the one above, where the seeming argument role turns out to be no 
argument role at all, at least not in the Standard sense of something that 
belongs to the arity of the relation under consideration, if we look closer 
at the kind of role this could be. To see this we have to ascertain first the 
arity of 'person'. I think it is zero-place, like 'raining', and not one-place, 
like 'sleeping', because every case of sleeping involves a sleeper, but cases 
of raining as well as cases of persons are self-sufficient: We have to bear 
in mind that there is a difference between playing the subject role in an 
instantiation of a relation and being such an instantiation itself. (The latter 
is sometimes referred to as 'the Davidsonian argument', misleadingly, as I 
would claim.) So a better notation would seem to be ( x =^ ((person))) and 
(s |= ((ram))). But then there are cases where one wants to be able to keep 
track of both the instantiation 7' of a relation R that minimally Supports 
the corresponding infon and other, larger situations s that still support it, 
so it is helpful to have a notation like (s (= ((Ä, i:r))), where the ' i: ' marks 
the pseudo-argument role of instantiation. 
Now all languages have a device for turning the instantiation role into 
an argument role, which is called copula, if it is a word, and zero-copula, if 
it is simple concatenation. Semantically, this is nothing eise than putting 
the instantiation relation into the infon. So the following are equivalent: 
(a) ((person, i : x ) ) 
(b) ((be-a-person, subject :x)) 
(c) ((be, subject:^, predicate:person)) 
(d) ((instantiate, instantiation:^, instantiated:person)) 
Cayuga, as we have seen, is a language with zero-copula, since it encodes 
instantiation by concatenation of the person prefix with the word stem. 
Therefore, in examples like 
($ f= ((little-younger-sibling, possessum:y, possessor : x ) ) ) 
above, we should replace the argument role label 'possessum:' by the in-
stantiation role label ' i : ' . And we should modify the notation Convention 
about role labels: They are omitted with one-place relations for the argu-
ment role (there is only one), and with zero-place relations (there is only 
the instantiation role around). 
I will close this section with the analysis of a complex Cayuga sentence, 
hoping that it will reveal more about objects as possible supporters in 
propositions: 
(7) a- ho- hto:' ho- tkw§'t- a' n§:ky§ h- 9kweh' 
Past- it:him- lose it:him wallet- Nom this:one he- person 
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As one can read off the m o r p h e m a t i c gloss, (7) means literally something 
like ( a n d here I quote Sasse's (1991) wording): "It was lost to him, it is 
his wallet, this one, he is a m a n , " or, simply, "This m a n lost h i s wallet." 
But unlike this English translation, (7) encodes not one, but potentially 
three different propositions. This is expressed by the representation (7') 
(disregarding tense a n d other subtleties): 
(7') a. s : (suU f= ((thematic, 5))), 
x : ( s u t t (= ((third, x))) C\(s\= ((neuter, x)) A ((sg, *))), 
y : ( s u t t \ = ((third, y » ) n (* |= ((male, y)) A ((sg, y)))| 
(5 \ = ((lose, possessum:x, possessor:y))) 
b. sf : ( s u t t \ = ((thematic,«'))), 
z : (sutt (= ((third, z))) fl («' \ = ((neuter, z)) A ((sg, *))), 
u : ( s u t t \ = ((third, u))) D (*' |= ((male, w)) A ((sg, «)))| 
(«' |= ((wallet, i:z, possessor :u))) 
c. s" : ($utt (= ((thematic, s"))), 
v : ( s u < t |= ((point-at, pointer:speaker(s ut<), pointed:i;))), 
w : ( « t t « |= ((third, w))) n (5" |= ((male, w)) A ((sg, ti;)))| 
(i> |= ((person, w))) 
The truth conditions for (7') are the following: (a) There is a Situation s 
that is t h e m a t i c i n the utterance Situation a n d i n s a t h i r d person male y 
who lost some singular object x\ (b) there is a thematic Situation s' a n d in 
s' some singular wallet z belonging to a t h i r d person m a l e u; (c) there is a 
t h e m a t i c Situation $" a n d some v pointed at by the Speaker a n d i n some 
singular m a l e w such that v supports the infon that w is a (male) person, 
i.e., a m a n . If we reduce (7') to its m a x i m a l l y coherent f o r m , identifying 
all c o m p a t i b l e parameters a n d thereby resolving the a n a p h o r a , a n d if we 
pack non-focused propositions into the restrictions o n the parameters of 
the focused one, as we d i d above in (2'), the result is (7"): 
(7") s : (suu \ = ( ( themat ic ,« ) ) ) , 
x : ( s u t t (= ((third, x))) fl (s \ = ((neuter, x)) A ((sg, x))), 
V : (sutt \ = ((third, y)) A 
((point-at, pointer:speaker(s u *t) , pointed:y))) fl 
(s \ = ((male, y)) A ((sg, y)) A ((wallet, i:x, possessor:y))) fl 
(y |= ((person,y)))| 
(s |= ((lose, possessum:x, possessor:y))) 
(7") is true if there is some thematic Situation w i t h some non-speaking, non-
addressed singular t h i n g a n d some non-speaking, non-addressed singular 
m a l e pointed at by the Speaker where the former is a wallet possessed by 
the latter who is a man, such that in that Situation the former got lost to 
the la ' ter. Conceivable paraphrases are 'Speaking about a wallet possessed 
by this m a n here, it got lost to h i m ' or, keeping the postspecifying order, 
'It got lost to h i m , where ' i t ' means a wallet owned by h i m a n d 'him' means 
this m a n here.' 
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A comparison with the English translation shows that the conveyed in-
f o r m a t i o n is the same, whereas the way its Organization is encoded differs. 
In both languages, the relations of getting lost, of being one's wallet, a n d 
of being a man are expressed, a n d the focal role of the first one is opposed 
to the background role of the latter ones. But the difference between fo-
cus and background information is encoded in Cayuga by the difference 
between first and non-first position in the sentence, whereas in English, it 
is expressed by the difference between verbal and nominal encoding. 
A closer examination of (7") shows that the proposit ions which play a 
role in restricting the three parameters in the main proposition fall into 
three categories according to what kind of entity Supports the correspond-
ing infon: The utterance Situation, the thematic Situation or a thematic 
object. The question is, if one wants to challenge Olson's choice, if we 
couldn't do equally well without the last type. I think we could do without 
the last type, but we couldn't do equally well. Suppose we replace the last 
restricting proposition by (s |= ((person, y ) ) ) . Then we can conjoin its infon 
with the three infons of the preceding proposition and we are left with two 
kinds of information about y: Infons supported by the thematic Situation 
and infons supported by the utterance Situation. And now the difference 
between the Olsonian (7") and its alternative becomes visible: The alter-
native would entail nothing about the personhood of y in other situations 
than s, not even in the possibly different s u t t l whereas (7") entails that y 
is a person by virtue of its identity, independent of the Situation in which 
y happens to be, and as a result also in sutt. So Olson's choice seems 
to be especially welcome for those propositions that ascribe non-changing 
properties to objects. 
But was it necessary in order to reach this conclusion to travel so far to 
the Cayuga Indians? Of course it was not, at least epistemologically, but it 
certainly was psychologically helpful to gain some distance from the well-
known and to look at unfamiliar languages first before Coming back to the 
famil iär ones. Now we can see that we could have gained the same insight 
from a thorough investigation of English sentences like "This here, it is a 
blackboard" or "This is a blackboard." But that's the way it sometimes is 
with traveling: Its pay-off comes less from having seen the foreign country 
with your own eyes than from being able to see your own country with 
foreign eyes. 
6 Summary 
Now it is about time to return from Ontario and to ask ourselves whether 
and how our imaginary trip has fulfilled the three purposes stated at the 
beginning of the third section. 
First, we wanted to find out whether Situation Semantics is flexible 
enough to deal equally well with Cayuga as with English, and I think we 
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can say that the little evidence we could gather on the short field trip does 
not contradict this assumption. On the contrary, what we found supported 
the view that idealized languages of the Iroquoian type are even easier 
to handle, since the difference between verbal and nominal encoding of 
relations vanishes on the semantic level any way. And this is true not just 
for Situation Semantics, but for most formal theories of meaning. 7 
Second, we wanted to know whether Iroquoian could better be analyzed 
with a theory incorporating Olson's choice, and what we found out seems 
to support this hypothesis. But again, our findings are not restricted to the 
special pairing of Situation Semantics with Cayuga. This time, we could 
replace Cayuga by any natural language, and argue that propositions of the 
form 'this is an x' are most naturally conceived of as containing a thematic 
case, which may at least equally well be an object as a Situation, and which 
should be chosen according to the life-span of the validity of this property 
ascription. 
Third, concerning the Humboldt-Sapir-Whorf hypothesis concerning 
the impact of linguistic structure on the ways humans carve up their world, 
our trip was rather inconclusive, but from the few examples we have looked 
at, it looks like even such a dramatic difference as the lack of lexical com-
plements and noun phrases may force Speakers to organize the information 
they want to convey in different ways, but it does not force or even induce 
them to see the world differently. As an exercise the reader may try to 
speak English the Cayuga way, replacing for instance 'Let us eat the pie 
which I have baked' by 'Let's eat it. I have baked it. It pies' and so on. 
My prediction is that he will develop, if he does this for a sufficiently long 
period, a different style of communicating, but not a different perspective 
on the world. This is a Gedankenexperiment, and as such, it may help 
to assess plausibilities, not more. But if the conjecture it suggests can be 
corroborated, then we have to conclude that at least that part of the Iro-
quoian perspective which is induced by its sentence structure differs from 
the European one only with respect to the style of linguistic communica-
tion, without any further far-reaching consequences. 
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